Naskh in the Qur’an: A Conceptual and Historical Analysis with a Critique of Opponents’ Arguments

The issue of Naskh (the abrogation of a legal ruling by a subsequent divine ruling) is among the most important and contentious discussions in Qur’anic studies and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Using a descriptive–analytical method and library-based data collection, this study explains the linguistic and technical definitions of naskh, the historical development of research on the subject, the arguments of proponents and opponents, as well as its conditions and classifications. The findings indicate that disagreements over the definition of Naskh—whether broad or restricted—and over whether it includes cases such as specification (takhṣīṣ) and qualification (taqyīd) have led to significant differences in the number of abrogated verses identified by scholars. As a result, some have counted more than two hundred verses as abrogated, while others have reduced the number to fewer than ten, or even zero.
The textual evidence cited by proponents relies primarily on verses such as Qur’an 2: 106 and 16: 101, whereas opponents reject the occurrence of Naskh on the grounds that it would imply the impossibility of “badā’” (emergent knowledge) with respect to God and would contradict the Qur’an’s immunity from inconsistency. The article concludes that a precise understanding of Naskh requires distinguishing between its general and specific meanings, attending to the historical context of revelation and the aims of gradual legislation, and adhering to stringent conditions such as complete incompatibility between the two rulings and the absence of any indication that the first ruling was temporary.